Abstract-The spreading of dangerous malware or faults in inter-dependent networks of electronics devices has raised deep concern, because from the ICT networks infections may propagate to other Critical Infrastructures producing the well-known domino or cascading effect. Researchers are attempting to develop a high level analysis of malware propagation discarding software details, in order to generalize to the maximum extent the defensive strategies. For example, it has been suggested that the maximum eigenvalue of the network adjacency matrix could act as a threshold for the malware's spreading. This leads naturally to use the spectral graph theory to identify the most critical and influential nodes in technological networks. Many wellknown graph parameters have been studied in the past years to accomplish the task. Here we test our AV11 algorithm showing that outperforms degree, closeness, betweenness centrality and the dynamical importance.
Abstract-The spreading of dangerous malware or faults in inter-dependent networks of electronics devices has raised deep concern, because from the ICT networks infections may propagate to other Critical Infrastructures producing the well-known domino or cascading effect. Researchers are attempting to develop a high level analysis of malware propagation discarding software details, in order to generalize to the maximum extent the defensive strategies. For example, it has been suggested that the maximum eigenvalue of the network adjacency matrix could act as a threshold for the malware's spreading. This leads naturally to use the spectral graph theory to identify the most critical and influential nodes in technological networks. Many wellknown graph parameters have been studied in the past years to accomplish the task. Here we test our AV11 algorithm showing that outperforms degree, closeness, betweenness centrality and the dynamical importance.
Index Terms-eigenvalue, graph, infrastructures, topology

I. INTRODUCTION
he malicious software (mal-ware) is a program code designed to produce undesired effects on a computer. Once malware was specialized. Today, the trend is reversed toward an unification of these different dangerous codes and towards a very high technical level. An issue is the capability to influence not only the ICT network but also various Critical Infrastructures dependent from ICT [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [11] , [13] . In order to obtain such a result, there are basically two strategies: the targeted intrusion and the cooperative search. The first foresees a direct conventional approach to the actual target, while the second one demands a distributed control system, a complex communication scheme and a consensus-like decision making process. As a side effect of the cooperative search, the malware (or the fault, it is the same in our approach) will spread in the network like a disease (the "epidemic" spreading). Actually, any kind of worm follows the epidemic spreading, but a standard worm will attempt to invade the maximum number of machines as quickly as possible, instead a sophisticated malware adopting a cooperative search strategy or even a simpler network aware strategy, will infect (relatively) few machines during a long period of time. In any case, both seem to propagate following the T epidemic spreading model, at least during the initial phase of the attack. Thus, understanding this model may help in countering the spreading at the very beginning of it, when the cost of the defence is more affordable. Important results on the threshold to the spreading are those of Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani [3] for the scale free graphs, and subsequently by Wang et al. [1] and Chakrabarti et al. [2] for a generic graph. "Generic graph" means no assumption is made on the graph (scale-free, random, small-word, degree distribution, etc) or on the modeling Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible, SusceptibleInfected-Refractory, Infected-Refractory, etc (SIS, SIR, IR).
The threshold is related to two parameters, namely the infection rate β (average number of machines that can be infected per time unit by an already infected machine) and the cure rate δ (average number of machines that can be restored per time unit). Above the threshold the malware will propagate, otherwise it will end quickly.
We will use this claim to identify the most influential subset of nodes with respect to the maximum eigenvalue.
II. DETERMINING THE THRESHOLD
We will sketch the calculation of the threshold using the Peng's framework, as a theoretical support of our immunization strategy. Peng et al. [7] have provided an analytical treatment when β and δ vary but have tested their claim only on a random Erdos-Renyi artificial graph. Here we outline briefly the formalism to derive the stability conditions for the dynamic system of the spreading, (for details see [7] ). The homogeneous models [1] , [2] , [3] assume that every machine has equal contact to others in the population, thus the infection and cure rates are constant; instead, in this paper we consider a different infection rate for each link βij and a different cure rate for each node δi of the (directed or undirected) graph G representing the Italian AS network. βij and δi are extracted from a uniform distribution. The first step [7] is the modified adjacency matrix M obtained from the standard adjacency matrix A of the undirected graph G, whose entries mij are modified according to:
Note that we allow G to be directed, i.e. βij ≠ βji with no loss of generality. The difference system representing the infection dynamics on G is:
where pi(t ) is the probability that the node i at the discrete time t is infected from the node k, N is the number of nodes. Note that the pi(t-1) should be mutually independent; if this is not the case, the threshold value cannot be calculated exactly within the Peng's framework [7] . Now, since:
the system (2.1) converges to zero iff the difference system (2.2)
converges to zero. In compact notation the (2.2) is:
The system (3) is stable if the largest eigenvalue of M is [9] : λM < 1 therefore:
lim P(t) = 0 when t → ∞ and pi(t ) → 0 , i = 1 ... N the epidemic spreading disappears. Since M is non negative, its largest eigenvalue is a real number and the analytical threshold can be set to:
Anyway, in this paper we do not use this threshold due to the unrealistic [7] independence assumptions for (1) .
Note that (4) says nothing about the actual spreading above the threshold: it states only a stop below the threshold. The real significance of (4) is that the spreading depends on graph topology: immunizing nodes/links affects strongly the diffusion of malware. It is also worth noting that the threshold may be considered as a phase transition, whose mathematical treatment is difficult [15] .
III. THE IMMUNIZATION ALGORITHMS
Now we introduce some of the most popular procedures to determinate a number of the most influential nodes [8] (called the "budget"). Once these nodes have been selected, we "immunize" them, meaning the cure rate becomes high. Then we run the simulations and verify if the infection has been stopped or mitigated. All the methods (except the k-core, because it depends directly from the degree) have been tested to evaluate their immunization capability. Actually, many more methodologies exist, but the following are probably the more representatives. Most infected: according to this simple procedure, the most influential nodes are those who get infected very often in the simulations. Degree: simply the number of links form/to a node. Intuitively a high degree node ("hub") may be influential. Closeness: inverse measure of centrality associated with a node. The sum of the shortest path lengths between a given node and all other nodes in the graph. Vertices that tend to have short geodesic distances to other vertices in the graph have higher closeness. Betweenness: total number of shortest paths between every possible pair of nodes that pass through the given node. Vertices that occur on many shortest paths between other vertices have higher betweenness. Dynamical Importance: variation of the max eigenvalue after a node has been removed. Indicates how much the node is influential with respect to the others. It is a spectral method. Estrada Index: SC of a vertex is the "sum" of closed walks of different lengths in the network starting and ending at vertex. It characterizes nodes according to their participation in subgraphs of the network, giving higher weights to the smaller subgraphs that can be involved in network motifs. It is a spectral method. K-core: every subgraph has a vertex of degree at most k: That is, some vertex in the subgraph touches k or fewer of the subgraph's edges. Nodes are ranked accordingly. AV11: For a given graph G, we want to identify simultaneously the k best nodes (the "budget") to immunize or remove, to make the remaining nodes more robust to the attack.
Of course, following the spectral paradigm one could remove a set of k nodes and find the decrease of the eigenvalue, but this brute-force strategy is impossible to use, even for small graphs, because of the huge number of combinations. The problem is NP-complete [14] , thus we resort to our suboptimal algorithm AV11 to reduce complexity and calculation time as its estimated complexity is O(kn 3 *lg(k)). On the other hand, the simple strategy (calculating the eigenvalue for a single node at a time, rank the results and take the first k nodes) does not guarantee good performances, and above all, is easily understood by the attacker. In fact the attacker running the same simple algorithm would get exactly the same information. The AV11 pseudocode (see the Appendix for a justification and [8] for details) is:
1. Calculate eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A; 2. Initialize: S to empty; Z= In; D= (1+| λm|)In ; 3. Node=0. For i= 0 to k do 4. P = ( Z*A*Z+D ) p ; 5.
Node= max( diag(P) ); 6.
Add node to S; 7.
Set Z[node, node]= 0; 8. end for ; 9. return S. IV. EXPERIMENTS In Table 1 and Figure 1 are shown the effects of various immunization strategies. Starting from the network topology of 760 nodes of a LAN (Local Area Network), the algorithm select a number of nodes to be immunized (the "budget"). Clearly the budget should be as small as possible: in this case is below 4%. The infection developed in the center of the LAN (top image in Figure  1) , then all the nodes were affected. In the middle image are shown the nodes selected by AV11 to be immunized; in the last image the red points are the computers remained infected after the AV11 immunization.
Other experiments have been conducted on a High Voltage electricity distribution network (Table 2 and Figure 2 ), following the same criteria as above. Here the budget is the 13% of 208 nodes. Finally, the IEEE 118 Bus is analyzed (see Table 3 and Figure 4 ). The budget of nodes to be immunized is 16% of 118 nodes. 
V. CONCLUSION
The AV11 algorithm performs better than the others parameters in different topological scenarios. Note that the second best is not always the degree centrality, as an intuitive approach could conclude. We think the same holds for all the degree-like parameters as the K-core.
Even more important, note the very poor performance of the most infected strategy. According to this procedure, the influential nodes, i.e. those nodes that provide a major support to the epidemic spreading or the cascade effect, are those who get infected often during simulations. Our results demonstrate how deceiving this idea is.
Today the infrastructure protection is a major issue in the most important research programs in the world. In particular, the ICT infrastructure undergoes devastating attacks generated by malware and propagating to other Critical Infrastructures following a domino effect pattern. Software attack codes are becoming extremely sophisticated, difficult to detect or foresee and can adopt a network aware strategy or even an advanced cooperative target search.
Although more simulations should be repeated on other ICT networks, these tests suggest clearly that the spreading in the technological networks is governed by the topology, although our results may be transferred to different type of graph as the contact graph, but probably not to the social networks, who are governed by more complex interactions.
Therefore, modelling the malware spread or the fault cascading on graphs may result in a general purpose passive defence scheme, effective against a broad range of threats.
APPENDIX
Because an adjacency matrix A is symmetric, its eigenvalues are real. Let λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥...≥ λj ≥ λj+1 ≥...≥ λn-1 ≥ λn be the n eigenvalues of A. We apply the Separation Theorem for the Hermitian operators on an n -dimensional space. From this classical theorem, follows that if Ar is a principal submatrix of A of order r with eigenvalues α1 ≥
